The Collapse of The Iranian Dictatorship?

Given the way the Cold War ended, I have long thought that one of the crucial questions we must ask in international affairs is: how do dictatorships collapse? But these days, I'm starting to think a better question might be: why don't they collapse more often?

The rioting over the rigged election in Iran hasn't yet led to a collapse of the Iranian theocracy, and it may not do so, at least not immediately. But it has certainly reminded us what a brittle, dangerously unstable thing dictatorship is. Far from being the ruthless imposition of order and discipline, a dictatorship is a chaotic war of all against all, with the barely concealed hostilities ready to break out into a society-wide conflagration at any moment.

That is what the conflict in Iran is revealing: not just in the conflict between young, urban, middle-class liberals and the regime, but in the many fissures within the regime that are breaking apart.

It's important to notice that this whole election conflict began with a fight between two factions within Iran's religious establishment: the Rafsanjani faction versus the Ahmadinejad faction. Hashemi Rafsanjani is a cleric and former president—and a man who has turned the Iranian Revolution into a cash cow, exploiting the government's control over the economy to establish a vast, corrupt financial empire. He is widely believed to be the main financial supporter of the candidacy of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main opposition candidate in last Friday's election. Rafsanjani wanted to unseat the incumbent because his political power, and his vested interests, have been threatened by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's attempt to promote his own power base, the basij militia and the Revolutionary Guards, and take over the Iranian establishment. So on one level, this is a conflict between two factions of looters, fighting over who controls a vast network of patronage and corruption.

A battle over how to divide the loot is a conflict that is inherent in every dictatorship. But there is another angle to this conflict that is unique to a theocratic dictatorship. Ahmadinejad is not a cleric, and while he is supported by radical religious zealots, his main power base is among the military, especially the Revolutionary Guards. That's why his rigging of this election has been described by some as a kind of "military coup" against the existing political system. Iran is supposed to be a theocracy in which power is held by the religious establishment—but now Ahmadinejad has been bringing a kind of paramilitary establishment into power.

This reminds me of my least favorite argument for religious freedom, which is that freedom is necessary, not just to protect the state from religion, but to protect religion from the state. While there are a number of things wrong with this argument, there is nevertheless an important element of truth to it. When a religious establishment gains political power, religion becomes a pawn of secular power struggles. This is why theocracy is inherently unstable and tends to give way to what is called "caesaro-papism"—i.e., Caesar appointing himself as the Pope, the secular dictator asserting control over the religious establishment. That's part of what's happening in Iran: the broader Shiite clerical establishment faces the prospect of being suppressed by an alliance between a religious sub-clique led by Supreme Leader Khamenei and a military clique led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

To this, Jack Idema adds a somewhat chilling speculation:

"Did Rafsanjani back Mousavi in an attempt to restore Iran's cleric-controlled 'elected' government? Did he do it to restore corrupt patronage interests (e.g., his family's Pistachio monopoly)? Did the effort backfire when the most liberal elements got behind Mousavi's candidacy to oppose tyrannical domestic policy generally?

"Is Ahmedinejad's electoral victory (totally faked or otherwise)—which the ruling elite will now attempt to enforce by police power—a coup against Rafsanjani's older, more indirect, more corrupt method of obtaining false legitimacy for the government?

"Are Khamenei and the IRGC trying to use Ahmedinejad as a means for imposing a direct dictatorship of the Islamic fanatics that cannot be challenged by any other faction of Iranian society? In sharing power with the revolutionary faction of the Army, is Khamenei's clerical faction becoming militarized, too? Are they trying to set up a military-style dictatorship?

"And if they are, why?

"Are Khamenei and the IRGC working together to consolidate a war government?"

What Jack is implying is that the fanatics may be trying to wipe out all political opposition—not just by liberals, but opposition within the establishment—so that they will have a free hand to start a war in the Middle East. Are they consolidating power in preparation, say, for an attack on Israel?

But this is not just a cynical struggle for power between theocratic factions. There is also a genuine conflict between dictatorship and liberalism—and that is also a conflict that is reflected within the religious establishment.

A recent report from Tehran Bureau—a pro-liberal site run by Iranian exiles in Los Angeles—cites a movement by dissident clerics to condemn the rigging of the election and support popular resistance to the regime.

Mir Hossein Mousavi's, the main reformist rival to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, letter to the important ayatollahs in the holy city of Qom, asking them to protest the fraud and declare it against Islam, has sparked protests by the ayatollahs and clerics as well.

The Association of Combatant Clerics, which consists of moderate and leftist clerics and includes such important figures as former president Mohammad Khatami, Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha, and Grand Ayatollah Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardabili, issued a strongly-worded statement, calling the results of the election invalid.

Grand Ayatollah Saafi Golpaygaani, an important cleric with a large number of followers, warned about the election results and the importance that elections in Iran retain their integrity.

Grand Ayatollah Yousef Saanei, a progressive cleric and a confidante of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, has declared that Mr. Ahmadinejad is not the legitimate president and cooperation with him, as well as working for him, are haraam (against Islam and a great sin). He has also declared that any changes in the votes by unlawful means are also haraam. Several credible reports indicate that he has traveled to Tehran in order to participate in nationwide protests…. It is said that he has planned a sit-in in some public place, in order to further protest election fraud….

The nation is waiting to hear the views of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important ayatollah living in Iran and the strongest clerical critic of the conservatives. He has been asked to issue a clear statement, explaining his views about the election fraud.

Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has just done so, issuing a statement that "a government not respecting people's vote has no religious or political legitimacy" and specifically calling on the police and the army—the men with guns—"not to 'sell their religion,' and beware that receiving orders will not excuse them before god."

This is a reminder that there is a long Shiite tradition of "quietism"—not a principled belief in separation of church and state, but at least a belief that it is inappropriate for the clergy to become actively involved in politics and therefore a respect for secular government and representative government. The Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Iranian theocracy, was actually a kind of theological rebel against that tradition, but the old quietists still have many advocates. The Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq is one of them, and so is Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

But if this all were just about a power struggle within the Iranian establishment—even one based on theological principles about the relationship between religion and the state—then it would not be the big news that it is. There is also a much broader conflict between the people of Iran and a state that refuses to submit to the consent of the governed.

There have been a few Western commentators who have tried to convince us that Ahmadinejad legitimately won the election. See here, and more obnoxiously here. These arguments are dripping with contempt for "Iran experts"—put in scare quotes—who are supposedly just mimicking the views of a small number of English-speaking, middle-class liberals in wealthy North Tehran, but who are out of touch with the views of the Iranian people, who support their theocratic masters. Never mind that many of these Iran experts are, in fact, actual Iranians and not just credulous Westerner observers (see a round-up of the consensus among Iran experts). Note also that the main evidence cited by those who say Ahmadinejad won the election fairly is a telephone poll taken weeks before the election in which Ahmadinajad had the support of only 34% of the people—and 52% of voters were uncommitted, a sign of real discontent with the regime. This poll was taken before Mousavi emerged as the stealth reformist candidate, making him the figurehead for opposition to the regime.

And there is a lot of evidence that the opposition to the regime is, in fact, widespread, with large public protests containing people "young and old, dressed in traditional Islamic gowns and the latest Western fashions" and with shops across Tehran being closed in an unofficial general strike in support of the protesters.

But I should also note that, from the standpoint of political science, the exact ratio of supporters and opponents of the regime is not the only important issue. Submitting to the consent of the governed is not just about securing the approval of the majority that wins a particular election; it is also about securing the acquiescence of the minority that loses the election. If the losing side is confident that the vote was open and objective, they will recognize that the resulting government has some basic legitimacy. In fact, as the American example shows, the losers will generally spend the next year analyzing what they did wrong and excoriating themselves for their failure to persuade their fellow voters. If you have been to a meeting of Republicans lately, you know what I mean.

In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed this effect and contrasted it to the dangerous form political opposition takes in a monarchy or dictatorship. In America, he observed, political opposition was peaceful because it has the prospect of gaining power by persuading the public. In France, by contrast, political opposition had traditionally been seditious, since it saw no prospect for gaining power except by erecting barricades in the streets and trying to overthrow the government. The same applies to Iran. In a sense, it doesn't matter whether the opponents of the regime are two-thirds of the people or only one-third. They know they have no way of seeking redress for their grievances except through mass protests in the streets—or more extreme measures.

Jack Idema notes that, after a massive march of 500,000 people in Tehran on Monday to protest the election result,

Seven protesters were shot dead by IRGC "militia" members when, as the evening hours began, hundreds attacked a "military" office with firebombs and set parts of the facility ablaze. (CNN footage clearly shows Molotov cocktails being thrown at a gated office building and the grounds and parts of the first floor of the building on fire.) The government claimed (probably correctly) that a faction with the much larger protest was attempting to seize small arms kept at the building, in order to arm themselves. This tiny attempt at an armed rebellion was stopped when basij militia thugs repelled the attack with rifle fire, hitting 28 people, killing 8.
Short of armed insurrection, what the Iranians need is a "man on the tank" moment—as in Russia in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin rallied the support of the very soldiers sent to suppress opposition to a coup by Soviet hardliners. Or they need something like the moment in 2004 when Ukrainian security officials met with leaders of the "Orange Revolution" and publicly announced that they would protect the protesters against a violent crackdown. What they need is for some significant faction of the men with guns to flip to the side of the protesters. We may know soon if this is possible.

In Iran, one of the factors holding the country back from armed conflict is the attention of the rest of the world, by way of the foreign media. Jack notes:

"Seeking the support of the English-speaking Western world, 'Where is my vote?' signs printed in English were held high by thousands of urban middle class protesters. Right now the protesters are partially protected by the cameras of the British press and, through them, by the hundreds of millions of eyes that will witness serious crimes broadcast around the world. But their visas—issued for news coverage of the election—will expire this week."

When the foreign reporters are gone, Iran's dictators are hoping that there will be no one left to restrain them. And our president has told them, in effect, that they are right. President Obama admitted to being "worried" and "concerned" about the vote in Iran and the suppression of political opposition—but he also made it clear that he does not want the US to be seen to "meddle" in Iranian affairs. As his speech in Cairo warned us, he is so fixated on America's alleged sins that he believes we have no moral authority to assert our interests or support our friends abroad.

Earlier, I said that two crucial questions are "how do dictatorships collapse?" and "why don't they collapse more often?" The point of asking those question is to ask: how can we help them to collapse, and what are we doing to prop them up? Obama's appeasement and passivity provides an answer to that second question.

With America placed on the sidelines by our own leader, it is up to the Iranian people now. As Jack concludes:

"Reform of Iran's Islamist dictatorship will be won either by national collapse—suddenly due to foreign military intervention or slowly by economic and social decay—or by civil war."

Either way, chaos, internal turmoil, and civil war are the inevitable results of dictatorship. This is the great advantage that free nations enjoy, and it is what has made it possible (so far) for us to survive the fecklessness of our leaders. Our enemies may threaten to destroy us—but they are always on the verge of destroying themselves.